ABSTRACT
At present the dollar, the euro, and yen are the main forms of money serving as units of account, means of circulation, means of payment, and reserve funds in the world market. For the moment, at least, the dollar remains dominant. Relationships among these currencies, and between members of this group and other currencies, are a crucial dimension of the contemporary global order.
Neoliberal theorists hold that financial markets necessarily tend to be rationally efficient.
While individual traders may err, over time the collective wisdom of the market processes relevant information far more accurately and quickly than government officials. Most countries or currency unions should therefore leave the determination of the relative value of their currency to the market (Friedman 1953) . The longer the government maintains an inappropriate exchange rate, the sharper and more harmful the eventual revaluation, as the 1997 East Asian crisis demonstrated (DeRosa 2001) .
Post Keynesians reject the rational efficiency hypothesis. The future is radically uncertain; it is impossible to calculate even the probability that a particular path of development will be followed in capital asset markets (Davidson 2002, Chapter 3) . Given this uncertainty, successful investment is a matter of anticipating shifts in the 'bearish' and 'bullish' sentiments of fellow traders. Also, the motive for investing in financial assets is generally not to hold the fixed assets they represent for the long-term, but to profit from selling the former in the short-to-medium term. Unregulated financial markets are thus prone to instability. As investment sentiment shifts in a 'bullish' direction, investors 2 who anticipated this shift win high profits, attracting further 'bullish' investments. A self-reinforcing boom may then occur. Even those who realize the boom cannot be sustained indefinitely join the bandwagon, hoping that term a 'bigger fool' will be found to whom they can sell. When investor sentiment reverses at some contingent point for some contingent reason, a stampede out of the asset commences.
Freely floating or loosely pegged exchange rates generate other troubling tendencies as well, according to Post Keynesian analysis. The great danger of volatility in currency markets tends to result in lower rates of long-term investment.
1 Lower rates of long-term productive investments lead to lower rates of growth, higher unemployment, and a higher level of unmet wants and needs.
Government officials, realizing the harm a speculative run on their currency can inflict, attempt to reduce exchange rate volatility by accommodating to the market sentiment that government deficits and higher wages set off inflation. Policies designed to restrict government spending and hold down wages reinforce the depressionary bias in the operation of world money.
The institutionalization of neoliberal policies in recent decades is in fact associated with lower rates of growth, lower wages, and higher unemployment than the "golden age" of the quarter century after world war two. Post Keynesian theorists believe that this social regression is primarily explained by the potential volatility and depressionary biases introduced into the world market by the present system of world money. Financial flows, which should serve the end of industrial development, now hamper it. The eight proposals for the reform of the IFA formulated by Davidson are intended to reverse this perversion. In Davidson's global order: 3 First, the unit of account and ultimate reserve asset for international liquidity is the International Monetary Clearing Unit (IMCT). All IMCUs can be held only by the central banks of nations that abide by the rules of the clearing union system … Second, each nation's central bank or, in the case of a common currency (for example, the euro) a currency union's central bank, is committed to guarantee one-way convertibility from IMCU deposits at the clearing union to domestic money….
Third … Contracts to be settled in terms of foreign currency will require some publicly announced commitment from the central bank (through private sector bankers) of the availability of foreign funds to meet such private contractual obligations.
Fourth, the exchange rate between the domestic currency and the IMCU is set initially by each nation or currency union's central bank. (Davidson 2002: 232-3) With only one form of world money, the IMCU, the horrific economic and social disruptions caused by abrupt and massive revaluations of the dollar, the mark, and yen -and of other currencies linked to them -that have beset the global economy in recent decades would be eliminated (Brenner 1998 (Brenner , 2002 ).
One-way convertibility permits each nation to control international flows of capital funds.
One cause of the East Asian crisis was local bank borrowing (denominated in dollars) from global capital markets, which was then used for speculative investments in capital assets such as real estate.
When the resulting bubbles collapsed, the local currency was devalued, exacerbating the difficulty of repaying foreign creditors in dollars. Post Keynesians insist that governments have the tools to prevent this situation from arising. Davidson's next proposal furthers this agenda as well:
Fifth, an overdraft system should be built into the clearing union rules. Overdrafts should make available short-term unused creditor balances at the clearing house to finance the productive international transactions of others who need short-term credit. (Davidson 2002: 233-4) This objective cannot be attained if some nations continually hoard a portion of their foreign export earnings and net unilateral transfers. Such behavior logically implies that other nations must remain in deficit. In the present international financial architecture the burden of this imbalance falls almost entirely on debtors, who must divert more and more resources to foreign creditors.
From a Post Keynesian standpoint this situation is intolerable: to deficit members (Davidson 2002: 234) .
Without excess oversavings in surplus nations, nations suffering payments deficits have greater opportunities to reverse the deficit by selling abroad.
Davidson's seventh recommendation is that exchange rates between local currencies and the IMCU be fixed, changing only when a change in efficiency wages occurs. This ensures that firms will not suffer a competitive disadvantage due to changes in nominal exchange rates apart from changes in the real costs of production. This removes the temptation for a nation to pursue growth through a real exchange rate devaluation that does not reflect its relative efficiency. The rule also assures each central bank that the long-term purchasing power of the IMCU in terms of foreignproduced goods remains stable. If inflation breaks out in a particular national economy, the exchange rate between its currency and the IMCU must be devalued. If productivity advances lead to declining production costs measured in local currency, then the country could choose to revalue the exchange rate so the IMCU buys fewer units of domestic currency without any loss of purchasing power. In this case all the benefits from the productivity advance are captured in the national economy. Or the nominal exchange rate could be kept constant, lowering the country's export prices and thus expanding its export markets. The benefits of the productivity advance would then be shared with nations importing its commodities at the lower prices.
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International payments deficits may still persist even if no nation can accumulate excessive surpluses indefinitely. Davidson's final proposal addresses this problem. If a poor country falls into deficit, rich countries must transfer some of their excess credit balances to it, enabling it to develop its productive capacity and increase its exports to the point where it can maintain its standard of living. If the deficit nation is relatively wealthy, it must devalue its exchange rate by gradual increments until its lower export prices and higher import prices eliminate the export-import imbalance. If these measures attain a positive balance of trade in goods and services without eradicating the payment deficit, then the international debt service load is too high. Negotiations must then commence to lengthen the payments period, reduce interest charges, or forgive debts (Davidson 2002: 236-7) .
The chances of these proposals being adopted are roughly comparable to the odds of my becoming Pope. But they are based on an accurate assessment of the weaknesses of neoliberal theory. And they powerfully express the deep utopian drive to imagine a form of capitalism capable of fulfilling its unmet promises. The limits of these imaginings must be carefully specified, for these limits are the limits of capital (Smith 2003 ).
Perhaps the most basic limit regards Davidson's methodological framework. He begins with the assumption that the capitalist world market ought to be designed to allow the greatest feasible satisfaction of human wants and needs. He then attempts to deduce what shape world money must take in order to achieve that goal. From a Marxian standpoint, if the goal is to comprehend a given set of social forms, we shouldn't assume that these forms are subordinate to a normative principle.
The principle in question may turn out to be quite extrinsic to them. A materialist methodological framework would begin instead with an examination of the basic social relations defining capitalism, tracing their implications to the bitter end. The proper question is not, 'What must world money be, 7 if human wants and needs are to be satisfied to the greatest extent feasible?' The question is instead, 'What must world money be, given the social relations defining capitalism?'
From a Marxian standpoint the social relations defining capitalism are value relations, capital/wage labor relations, inter-capital relations, interstate relations, and the relations constituting the world market. Each is relevant to our understanding of world money.
Value relations
From the neoliberal standpoint activity there is no overall end or goal to social life as a whole in market societies. Individuals seek to further their own ends, either alone or in groups, with money serving merely as a generalized means for this pursuit of particular ends (Hayek 1976 
Capital/wage labor relations
Units of production in which concrete labor is privately undertaken are units of capital subject to the valorization imperative. The accumulation of money capital is not merely the social validation of privately undertaken labor; it is simultaneously the reproduction of the capital/wage labor relation. In so far as accumulation ultimately occurs on the level of the world market, world money cannot be adequately comprehended in abstraction from this dynamic.
Post Keynesians want a form of world money enabling states to pursue full employment policies in their national economy without being punished by financial markets. But not all 'stakeholders' are created equal; investors and top managers are the ones making the 'contributions' and bearing the 'risks' that capitalist ideology, law, and practice proclaim merit the greatest reward.
Further, the generalized insecurity of capitalism means that no amount of capital accumulation is ever sufficient; more is always better. What is 'fair' from the standpoint of capital will thus tend to be far different from what is 'fair' from the standpoint of wage laborers. And this is but one area of irresolvable conflict. Issues regarding the length and intensity of the work day, the appropriate level of skill and creative work for each job, and so on, necessarily tend to generate systematic antagonisms as well.
Full employment tends to shift the balance of power in labor's favor, profoundly threatening the self-valorization of value. Those who control money capital will attempt to reverse this state of affairs through investments in labor-saving (and deskilling) technologies, capital flight to regions 9 where the work force is relatively docile/intimidated, and capital strikes (including shifts of investment from production to financial speculation). Maintaining full employment over time in these circumstances demands far more than an incomes policy. It demands expropriation of the holders of money capital (de Brunhoff 1978: Chapter 1).
Capitalist world money inevitably reflects the social antagonisms of the capital/wage labor relation. It is incoherent for Post Keynesians to accept the social relations defining capitalism, while simultaneously advocating a new form of world money designed to enable full employment in the capitalist world market. The former rules out the latter.
Inter-capital relations
The social relations of capital include various inter-capital relations. For present purposes it is sufficient to note the distinction between financial capital and industrial capital. It should go without saying that Post Keynesian proposals to introduce a new form of world money would be categorized as 'financial repression' and fiercely resisted by financial capital. Matters are more complex regarding industrial capital.
It is possible to assert that there was a "Keynesian moment" after world war two when the interests of industrial capital could be furthered through 'financial repression'. In this period the concentration and centralization of industrial capital had reached the point where production was organized primarily on the level of the national economy (however important imports of raw materials and exports of finished products). And the systematic cycle of accumulation was in its first phase of material expansion (Arrighi 1994) . This moment has now passed. The concentration and centralization of industrial capital has proceeded apace. And material expansion has given way to a global overaccumulation crisis.
10
In the present moment of world history it is in the interests of leading industrial firms to have easy access to world money to fund cross-border production chains, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions (Moody 1997) . They also need access to world money to respond to overcapacity difficulties in their home market by invading markets where they have a competitive edge. Last but not least, it is in their interest to have easy access to world money in order to respond to overcapacity difficulties by shifting more of the surplus value they have accumulated (and more of the credit money they have borrowed) into the more lucrative financial sector.
For a set of (non-revolutionary) proposals to be feasible in a capitalist order, a ruling block must be formed in which factions of capital and non-capitalist classes are united under the leadership of a dominant faction of capital. For the Post Keynesian form of world money to be remotely feasible, a coalition of industrial capital and non-capitalist classes would have to be formed to challenge the grouping led by financial capital. Such a block will not emerge in the present historical conjuncture. The block that has formed, and will surely stay in place for the foreseeable future, is a coalition of financial, merchant, and industrial capitals dedicated to maintaining and extending a form of world money allowing cross-border commodity flows, foreign direct investments, overseas portfolio investments, etc., to occur with minimum hindrance.
Inter-state relations
The increasing importance of cross-border joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, portfolio flows, and so on, complicate the capital/state relationship immensely. At the present moment new transnational capitalist class identities are undoubtedly being forged (Robinson and Harris 2000) .
Nonetheless, it remains the case that the interests of the dominant sections of the hegemonic state and the interests of the dominant factions of capital in the world system remain intertwined (Wood 2003) . In so far as it is against the interests of the dominant factions of capital to introduce a form of 11 world money restricting cross-border money flows, this directly challenges the interests of the dominant state as well.
Further, the currency of the hegemonic state necessarily tends to play a privileged role in the world market as the main form of world money (Gowan 1999) . As a direct result the hegemonic state does not face the limits on the ability to create credit money and borrow from global capital markets imposed on other nations. For extended periods of time, at least, it can fund massive trade deficits without significant declines in the value of its currency. As long as credit flows to the hegemonic state continue, that is, as long as loans are rolled over by new loans, trade deficits can balloon and deep recessions can be avoided, as more and more of the world's output is consumed in the domestic markets of the hegemonic state. The only costs of maintaining this state of affairs are the fees involved in the new loans (Guttmann 1994: 114-5) . When levels of debt to foreign investors are finally deemed excessive, a devaluation of the currency can then erode the value of foreigners' claims.
These privileges of "seigniorage" (in the broadest sense of the term) partially rest on the need of foreign economic agents to obtain world money to undertake international payments and investments. Foreign central banks also need to hold reserve funds of the hegemonic currency to reassure global capital markets. And central banks must often sell their domestic currencies and buy the hegemonic currency in order to prevent exports from being harmed by currency appreciations.
If IMUCs were to become the sole form of world money, there would be no space for the currency of the hegemonic state to play a special role in the world market. And yet hegemonic states would still exist. Hegemonic states have played a central role in capitalist development, providing the indispensable public goods required for a region to serve as the center for global accumulation for an entire systematic cycle of accumulation (Arrighi 1994) . To leave capitalist production 12 relations in place is to leave in place the hierarchical interstate system. Is it really plausible to hold that a hegemonic capitalist state (or any states imagining themselves playing this role in the near future) will voluntarily renounce the immense benefits of seigniorage? The question answers itself. equal to the ratio of rest of the world's income elasticity of demand for A's exports to A's income elasticity of demand for imports (Davidson 2002: 160; see Thirlwell 1979) .
The world market and uneven development
The systematic tendency towards uneven development can be described in terms of this equation:
(I)f less-developed nations (LDCs) of the world have a comparative advantage in the exports of raw materials and other basic commodities that typically have a low income elasticity of demand, while the LDCs have a high income elasticity of demand (Eldc) for the manufactured products of the developed world, then, for these LDCs:
(Erw/Eldc) < 1. LDCs are condemned to relative poverty, and the global inequality of income will become larger over time (Davidson 2002: 160) .
Davidson advocates a capitalist world market in which flows of International Monetary
Clearing Units enable states to pursue industrial development policies vigorously, without being punished by global capital markets. Successful implementation of these policies will presumably result in the same sort of product mix in poorer regions as wealthier regions, thereby eradicating uneven development.
In this context Davidson's seventh proposal warrants closer attention. It stated that exchange rates between the IMCU and local currencies are to be fixed, changing only when successful product or process innovations improve productivity. The country in which the improvement occurs can then choose to revalue its domestic currency so that the IMCU buys fewer units of it without any loss of purchasing power. Or the nominal exchange rate can be kept constant, with the advance in productivity lowering the unit prices of the country's exports. Either option generates its own systematic tendency for uneven development in the world market.
Suppose the former option is taken, and the IMCU buys fewer units of the technically advanced nation's currency. The productivity advance enables a more rapid rate of economic growth and a higher level of material output. A virtuous circle can then be established in this region; high levels of growth and output can fund a high level of future R&D funding, providing important preconditions for future advances in productivity. In contrast, lower levels of growth and output in 14 other regions limit their ability to engage in advanced R&D, limiting opportunities for productivity advances in the succeeding period.
If the second option is selected, and nominal exchange rates are kept constant in the region enjoying the productivity gain, precisely the same virtuous and vicious circles necessarily tend to emerge. The nation enjoying the advance can lower the unit prices of its exports, gaining share in export markets while increasing profits. These profits can then fund the high levels of R&D that are preconditions for future productivity advances and high levels of growth. Other regions, unable to match that level of R&D funding, confront significantly fewer future opportunities. Global inequality tends to increase.
The drive to appropriate surplus profits through technological innovation is an inherent feature of inter-capital competition (Mandel 1975: Chapter 3; Smith 2002) . This drive generates a systematic tendency towards uneven development in the world market. Reversing this tendency would require that scientific-technological advance be recognized as a creation of social collective labor whose benefits belong to all members of the human community. The institutionalization of that principle would require far more than reform of the capitalist 'international financial architecture'.
Conclusion
Any adequate account of world money must be rooted in the essential determinations of the capitalist world market. Post Keynesian theorists such as Davidson advocate a form of world money that, while not being itself an object of accumulation, allows full employment and industrial development across the world market, leading to both a geopolitical balance among states and an economic balance among regions of the global economy. But capitalist property and production relations systematically require a form of world money whose accumulation is an end in itself. They also generate flows of world money that reproduce the structural coercion lying at the heart of the 15 capital/wage labor relation. The passing of the historical moment of the 'developmental state', the tendency for cross-border joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, production chains, portfolio flows, loans, and so on, to increase over time, and the tendency for periods of rapid material expansion to alternate with periods of overaccumulation and heighten financial speculation, all imply that capitalism requires a form of world money that flows easily to regions and sectors where potential rates of accumulation are thought to be highest. The tendency for the interests of capitals in hegemonic regions to be intertwined with the interests of a hegemonic state in the inter-state system, and the compelling benefits of seigniorage to this hegemonic power, imply that capitalist world money is a geopolitical weapon, not a neutral instrument of trade. And the tendency to uneven development arising primarily (but hardly exclusively!) from the ability of leading capitals to appropriate surplus profits through innovations implies that capitalist world money necessarily tends to flow in a manner that allow surplus profits to be appropriated in privileged regions of the capitalist world market, whatever the cost to individuals and communities in other regions.
Neoliberal theories and policies ignore each and every one of these structural features of the world market. When all is said and done, the far more radical proposals of Post Keynesians leave these tendencies in place as well. The ideals underlying Post Keynesian calls for a new form of world money are commendable. But no form of world money can fulfill the tasks Davidson assigns as long as the social relations of capitalism remain in place. A quite different set of social forms is required.
